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THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS: THE NEED FOR A
STATUTORY SOLUTION
International industrial conversion to consumer production after
World War II was accompanied by rapid advances in industrial tech-
nology. The great expenditures on research and development by
American industry begun then have since burgeoned, giving birth to an
ironically circular problem: the need to remain technologically com-
petitive has made industrial theft an attractive alternative to expending
funds for research; and research has produced an ever more sophis-
ticated array of technical devices to facilitate theft.1 Moreover, with the
introduction of the computer, the ease of misappropriation combined
with the potentially enormous value of a compact body of information
has added immensely to the incentives for industrial espionage.2 Both
the rewards from industrial espionage and the means to engage therein
have thus reached an unprecedented level.
Meanwhile, the body of state and federal law that has traditionally
coped with the problem languishes in a deepening maze of conflict and
confusion. The English common law of trade secrets early found its
way to America,' but any hopes that it would evolve into a unified body
died when Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 4 relegated protection of trade
secrets to the common or statutory law of the several states.5 On the
other hand, the exclusive federal patent system, the constitutionally
established means for protecting inventions,6 has become less available
due to the rising standard of patentability imposed by the courts. In
1941 the Supreme Court ruled that a "new device, however useful it
may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of
the calling." ' Later cases, while repudiating the "flash of creative
1 Netolicky, Electronic Eavesdropping (Bugging): Its Use and Countermeasures,
in BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE 213, 217-29 (R. Greene, Jr., ed. 1966).
2 A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 27-32 (1971).
3 Compare Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868), with Morison v. Moat,
68 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ch. 1851). Neither case elaborated upon the relationship between
patent laws and the protection of trade secrets. See Orenbuch, Trade Secrets and
the Patent Laws, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 638, 642-46 (1970).
4 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of the consequences of Erie in the realm
of unfair competition law and a call for uniform federal legislation, see Kunin,
Erieantompkinitis: The Malady and Its Cure, in ABA SECTION OF PATENT, TRADE-
MARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 276 (1961).
5 Several states supplement common law civil protection with criminal statutes
penalizing some trade secret thefts. For a list of state statutes, see Vandevoort,
Trade Secrets: Protecting a Very Special "Property" 26 Bus. LAW. 681, 682 n.5
(1971); cf. 18 U.S.C. §§2314, 2315 (1970) (interstate transportation of stolen
property).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7 Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941); see
Rich, Test of "Unobviousness" v. Concept of "Invention," in NURTURING NEW IDEAS:
LEGAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC ROLES 349 (L. Harris ed. 1969).
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genius" test, fortified the test of "non-obviousness." 8 In addition,
patent protection, even when granted, has continued to shrink in scope
More and more disputes are coming within the scope of the various
state laws. The research and development efforts that followed the
war have been multiplied by an increasing fulfillment of Schumpeter's
"destruction by innovation": though more funds are expended on re-
search, new processes become obsolete much faster. Many of these
processes are sufficiently novel to be highly profitable, yet are un-
patentable. Even when they are, the lag between patent application and
grant has been estimated to average three years.1 ' Further, since in
only about thirty percent of infringement suits litigated to conclusion
have the patents in question been held valid and infringed upon,1 it is
no surprise that industry has turned increasingly to whatever protec-
tion it can find under trade secret law.
Not only has this confused body of state law been overworked, it
has been threatened-or so many have perceived-with obliteration.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,'2
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 3 and Lear, Inc. v. Adkins 4
have been responsible for these fears.'" Sears and Compco dealt not
with industrial espionage, or even trade secret licensing, but with a
state unfair competition law interpreted to prohibit the copying of
manufactured objects unprotected by federal patent law. The Court's
decision in Sears, however, was not narrowly delivered:
Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws
directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that for-
bidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind that
clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws. 16
Prior to these words, the peaceful coexistence of trade secret protection,
derived from the common law, and the patent scheme, derived from the
sSee Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61-63
(1969) ; United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48-52 (1966) ; Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-19 (1966) (standard for patentability has 3 elements: novelty,
utility, and nonobviousness). The nonobviousness test is derived from 35 U.S.C. § 103
(1970).
9 See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)
(holding unpatentable a mechanical component of a patented system).
10 Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. REv.
437, 455 (1960).
11 STAFF OF JOINT EcONOmIc Comm., 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., INVENTION AND THE
PATENT SYSTEM 16-17 (Comm. Print 1964). Patent protection is even more uncertain
because at present a patent owner who successfully defends his patent in one court
may soon be challenged in another. See Lieberman & Nelson, it Ren Validity-
A Two-Sided Coin, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 9 (1971). In suits to prevent use of
trade secrets, plaintiffs do somewhat better, prevailing in about 47% of the cases.
Mahon, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 536, 540 (1968).
12376 U.S. 225 (1964).
13376 U.S. 234 (1964).
14395 U.S. 653 (1969).
15 See text accompanying notes 74-82 infra.
16376 U.S. at 231.
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Constitution, had been accepted for almost a century. The Sears
opinion seemed to suggest a conflict between the two, and raised a
broad issue touching even clear cases of theft: Can the states provide
any protection for unpatented or unpatentable ideas without interfer-
ing with the balance between the federal patent and antitrust policies?
In response to that suggestion, the lower courts soon distinguished
between ideas in the public domain and those still secret.' Within the
bounds of that distinction trade secrets have been protected, by tempo-
rary injunctions, if obtained through breach of a confidential relation-
ship or other "improper means," but not if obtained by independent
research or by "reverse engineering" of a marketed product.' 8  Sears
and Compco were thus easily distinguished because they involved the
design of a product already within the public domain; indeed, it was by
no means clear that the Court had intended to reach undisclosed trade
secrets. 19
The problem did not die, however. Lear, a 1969 decision, resur-
rected the threat of federal preemption of state trade secret law, largely
because of Justice Black's especially sweeping concurring and dissenting
opinionY0 This threat, too, appears to have been rationalized away by
the most recent lower court opinion, but not without some difficulty, as
will appear below.
Under technological and economic pressures, industry continues to
rely on trade secret protection despite the doubtful and confused status
17 See Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 909,
918-19 & n.53 (1970).
sId. 919 & n.54.
19 Of the 57 cases citing the relevant aspect of Sears or Coinpco between 1964
and 1969, 24 distinguished the two; 28 followed them on similar facts (product
imitation) ; and only 5 cases extended their principle to other circumstances. Except
for contrary dictum in Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1965), both state and federal courts continued to protect
trade secrets after Sears. Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 CoaxELL L. Rav. 161, 189-90
n.178 (1970).
20 395 U.S. at 677:
One who makes a discovery may, of course, keep it secret if he wishes, but
private arrangements under which self-styled "inventors" do not keep their
discoveries secret, but rather disclose them, in return for contractual pay-
ments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws, which tightly regulate the
kind of inventions that may be protected and the manner in which they may
be protected. The national policy expressed in the patent laws, favoring free
competition and narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private
agreements among individuals, with or without the approval of the State.
This passage has spawned grave concern among executives and their lawyers. See
Adelman & Jaress, Inventions and the Law of Trade Secrets After Lear v. Adkins,
16 WAYxE L. REv. 77, 83-84 (1969); Handler, supra note 19, at 191-93; Trade
Secrets: Report of an Institute Clinic, 14 IDEA 212, 225-26, 268-72 (1970) ; cf. Arnold
& Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48 TEXAs L. Rv. 1235, 1240-42 (1970). But cf.
Comment, The Viability of Trade Secret Protection After Lear v. Adkins, 16 VILL.
L. REv. 551, 558 (1971). The predictable offspring of Black's opinion was Painton
& Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 442 F2d 216 (2d
Cir. 1971), discussed at text accompanying notes 93-96 infra, in which the district
judge concluded that "federal patent law requires an inventor to submit his ideas to
the Patent Office before he can compel consideration for the use of his idea." 309
F. Supp. at 274. The subsequent Congressional backlash is exemplified by S. 643,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. §301 (1971).
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of both common law and statutory remedies. Clear, uniform trade
secret protection is urgently needed, and it can be achieved only when
the continuing uncertainty of the preemption problem is laid to rest.
The most appropriate resolution would be the enactment of federal
legislation to settle both the preemption problem and the need for pro-
tection. This Comment will first examine the doctrinal problems
plaguing state trade secret protection. Secondly, it will trace these
theories in a recent industrial espionage case, in which the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in attempting to strike out in a new
direction, has both made the poverty of the old theories apparent and
exposed the formlessness of the newer ones. Thirdly, the latest resolu-
tion of the federal preemption problem, made by the Second Circuit in
Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,. will be discussed in the context of the
economic necessities dictating that the law solve that problem by
acknowledging that there is a need for reliable trade secret protection.
The final section will discuss the need for, and the problems in, drawing
federal legislation.
I. INTERNAL CONFUSIONS OF TRADE SECRET LAw: THE CONCEPTS
OF PROPERTY AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
Generally a trade secret is any information of commercial value,
not protected by patent, and not generally known or accessible. Ac-
cording to the venerable Restatement of Torts, a trade secret:
may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation
of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over com-
petitors who do not know or use it'
The subject matter constituting a trade secret has not been otherwise
restricted; it need not even be evidenced by some form of physical
matter2* A trade secret may draw on a known process or known
ingredients.' Items as disparate as customer lists, formulas, chemicals,
manufacturing processes,' 5 and, lately, computer programs, have been
considered worthy of trade secret protection.
26
The common law has evolved three basic elements of a cause of
action protecting trade secrets: (1) proof of the existence of an idea
not generally known and treated by the owner as a secret; (2) improper
21442 F2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
2 IV RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
23 See 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND
MONOPOLIES §51.1, at 352 (3d ed. 1968).
24 Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq. 756, 760-61, 55 A. 736, 737 (1903) (method of
mixing known ingredients protected as trade secret).
25 See 52 IowA L. REv. 63, 66-67 & nn.23-28 (1966).
26 See Bender, supra note 17, at 956.
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disclosure or use; and (3) proof of loss, either present or futureY The
third element is not troublesome: the measure of damages is loss of
competitive advantage, not loss of investment in research and de-
velopment.28
The first and second elements are troublesome. In the first, con-
fusion has abounded regarding what sort of thing is to be protected. 9
Although it may be expressed or manifested in physical matter that can
be misappropriated, a trade secret is by its nature an intangible thing.
As for the second element, it has been unclear what conduct is proscribed
with regard to a trade secret. While remedies are available, neither
leading authorities nor most cases have delineated with any certainty
just what sort of improper "disclosure" or "use" the remedies are
directed against. Misappropriation is itself divisible into two parts;
that is, an industrial concern seeking to misappropriate secrets of a
competitor can either attempt to subvert the latter's employees to whom
the secret has been voluntarily disclosed or engage someone not privy
to the secret to obtain it by whatever improper means are most effective.
Subversion of employees has received the bulk of attention in both the
literature and the courts.3 Modern industrial espionage has been in
large part neglected. Both merit treatment.
The lapse in the common law development may ultimately trace
back to Justice Holmes and to an unforeseen consequence of the other-
wise admirable judicial tendency to achieve an equitable result by the
most economical means. In one of the early leading cases in the area,
Holmes delivered a statement that has become as famous in its quotation
as unfortunate in its consequences:
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade
secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary
consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some
rudimentary requirements of good faith.3 1
The case was a suit to enjoin an employee from setting up his own
business based on the secret process of his employer. With the potential
damage clear and with the more immediate grounds of breach of con-
fidence available, Holmes felt no need to consider the additional claim
that property had been wrongfully appropriated. In his words:
27 52 IoWA L. Rav. 63, 66-68 & nn.20, 30, 34 (1966).
28 Id. 68.
29 This first element includes proof of secrecy or reasonable attempts by the
owner to protect that which is called a trade secret. See E.I. duPont deNemours
& Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024
(1971), discussed at text accompanying notes 47-59 infra; National Rejectors, Inc. v.
Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966). Intent to maintain secrecy will be disregarded,
however, if secrecy is not justified or if the secret is undeserving of equitable protec-
tion, as when secrecy is contrary to the public interest. See National Fertilizer Ass'n
v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178 (1937) (state regulation required labeling of components of
a fertilizer mixture).
30 See note 34 infra.
31 E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
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The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be.
Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not prop-
erty or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in
confidential relations with the plaintiffs .... 32
In accord with Holmes's analysis, the great majority of American
legal scholars and courts have whenever possible deemphasized the ques-
tion of plaintiff's property interests and the plaintiff's rights "against
the world" with respect to a trade secret. 3 Most of the cases have in fact
involved employees and breach of confidential relationship, not theft. 4
The courts have preferred to rely on the established legal theories of
quasi-contract, 35 unjust enrichment, 6 and fiduciary relationships.1
Initially, when trade secrets were more likely to be inventions or
manufacturing processes, reliance on the property rights of a plaintiff
might have been a good way to protect trade secrets."' But advancing
technology and increasingly complex business structures in the early
part of this century brought new complications. The courts began
protecting a variety of trade secrets that were not unpatented inventions
but rather were merely confidential information of no general market-
able value, although nevertheless valuable to a competitor. 39 Such facts,
valuable because of the exclusivity of their possession, required no
element of novelty or invention. A customer list and an advertising
scheme, for example, have been protected.4° The traditional concept
of property could not support protection of such information.
The life of the property doctrine, to the extent there has been
a doctrine at all, has been troublesome, and commentators are divided
on the question of its viability.41 Courts and commentators have been
321d.
33 See R. CALLMANN, supra note 23, § 53.4(b) ; 52 IowA L. Rxv. 63, 68-69 (1966).
34 In the treatises, the exhaustive list of cases dries up when the discussion
reaches industrial espionage without subversion of employees or trespass, and the
text at that point usually degenerates, for want of material, into a simple description
of the offense and its current prevalence. See R. CALLMANN, supra note 23, § 56, at
468 & n.99; R. MIuIm, TRADE SEcRETs § 5.05 (1971).
35 See _R. MirLGIm, supra note 34, § 4.02.
3GSee Mitchell Novelty Co. v. United Mfg. Co., 199 F.2d 462, 465 (7th Cir.
1952) ; Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1946).
37 See Trice v. Comstock, 121 F. 620 (8th Cir. 1903). From the very start of
trade secret protection in America, Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868), courts
took such approaches. Of course, until relatively recently, technology was generally
inadequate to facilitate trade secret theft without subversion or trespass.
38 Secret information was early held of measurable worth in stock valuation,
In re Brandreth's Estate, 28 Misc. 468, 59 N.Y.S. 1092 (Sur. Ct. 1899) (secret
recipes), and capable of forming the corpus of a trust, Green v. Folgham, 1 Sim. &
Stu. 398 (Ch. 1823).
39See R CALLMANxN, supra note 23, § 522; P, ELLis, TRADE SEcpRs 118 (1953).
4 O Friedman v. Stewarts Credit Corp., 26 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd,
261 App. Div. 990, 26 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1941) ; R CALLMANN, supra note 23, § 52.1, at
372 & n.16.
41 Compare R. MILGRIM, mupra note 34, § 1.01 (yes) ; R. CALLMANN, supra note
23, § 52 (uncommitted); R. Eixs, supra note 39, at 12 (not essential inquiry);
Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIo LJ. 4, 21 (1962) (no).
384 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
caught in the toils of the troublesome question: Are trade secrets prop-
erty? While commentators have reached no consensus, the courts,
unable to afford the scholarly luxury of indecision, have "settled" the
problem by recourse to the clearer doctrines that have presented them-
selves in the majority of cases.
A resolution of the conflicts and ambiguities in the property doc-
trine, while necessary and long overdue, will not alone provide a
complete solution to the problems of the industrial concerns seeking a
legal remedy for misappropriation by espionage. Even if the recog-
nition of a property interest in industrial secrets establishes the right to
protection of physical possession, it does not necessarily safeguard the
owner from the depredations of those who learn his trade secret without
asporting his "property." In the infamous Italian drug thefts, for
example, the owners were able to prosecute for larceny of the drug
cultures and of the copied formulas, but according to Judge Friendly
would have been helpless in seeking criminal sanctions if the formulas
had instead been memorized.42 In levying the National Stolen Property
Act 4' against the drug pirates, Judge Friendly adopted a better ap-
proach to this problem than previous courts:
In such a case, when the physical form of the stolen
goods is secondary in every respect to the matter recorded in
them, the transformation of the information in the stolen
papers into a tangible object never possessed by the original
owner should be deemed immaterial.'
The focus on the nature of the offense rather than on the physical prop-
erty misappropriated is an indispensable assertion of substance over
form. But Judge Friendly's approach does not go far enough. The
only way the law can effectively combat the methods of the modern
industrial spy is to focus entirely on the conduct of the defendant, thus
going beyond rejection of traditional property concepts to the complete
elimination of any asportation requirement.
The accommodation of doctrine to reality necessary to strike at the
substance of the offense has been sorely lacking in the common law with
its tradition of specific torts.4 5 Though the writ system has long been
42 United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
974 (1966). See also American Cyanamid Co. v. Fox, 36 Misc. 2d 1070, 224 N.Y.S.2d
363 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
43 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970).
44 United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393-94 (2d Cir. 1966).
45 It might be argued that doctrinal flexibility has come more readily to the
criminal law, despite the maxim compelling strict construction of criminal statutes.
See, e.g., id.; United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 937 (1961); United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959)
("goods" worth $5000 or more construed to include secret maps). A common law
criminal prosecution for trade secret theft, however, is unlikely to succeed because
of the requirement of permanent deprivation of possession of tangibles under common
law larceny. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 70-73 (1881).
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extinct, and unfair competition has itself gradually become a tort,"0
until recently it appears that no reported decision had upheld a private
right of action for misappropriation by industrial espionage accom-
panied by neither trespass nor conversion of goods. Such a case has
now arisen and both its facts and its holding suggest that the law of
trade secrets is about to enter a new phase in which those theories will
necessarily be replaced by a more accurate portrayal of the interests at
stake. Remarkably, over thirty years ago this eventuality was ex-
plicitly recognized by the authors of the Restatement of Torts, and
based on their foresight the Fifth Circuit has found its way, albeit
through a dark hall, to the correct result. As will be seen below, even
with the Restatement, only the vaguest outlines now exist to guide
decisionmaking in this new area, and the time is ripe for legislation
that will provide both certainty and national uniformity to a vital part
of our economy.
II. DuPont v. Christopher AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
On March 19, 1969, the Christophers, Rolfe and Gary, photog-
raphers, took to the air and busily practiced their trade over the new
addition to the duPont plant in Beaumont, Texas. Still under con-
struction, the addition, when completed, would manufacture methanol
by a secret-and unpatented-process. The company had developed
the process after extensive research and naturally enough took special
pains to preserve the competitive edge it expected to gain. Because
some of the buildings were unfinished, however, parts of the process
were exposed to view from overhead.
DuPont was understandably concerned about its aerial visitors
and immediately investigated. By that afternoon the company had
learned the identity of the Christophers and the object of their mission:
The lapse in the common law has prompted an increasing number of states to
enact criminal statutes proscribing trade secret theft. See note 5 supra. But criminal
statutes may shortsightedly fail to reach certain espionage situations. Some states
prohibit only copying of secret material, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c(b) (3) (West
1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.07 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4899.2(b) (2) (Supp. 1971). Another group of provisions prohibits theft by those
who "unlawfully obtain access" to secret material, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §499c(b)
(3) (West 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4899.2(b) (1) (Supp. 1971); and New
York's larceny statute prohibits "wrongfully" taking or obtaining secret scientific
material, N.Y. PEN AL LAW § 155.05(1) (McKinney 1967). The cited provision of
the California Penal Code requires both elements in combination. The problem with
these provisions is that use of the undefined words "unlawfully" or "wrongfully"
leaves open the question whether a theft involving neither breach of confidence nor
physical trespass is proscribed. It is unclear whether the defendants in the Christopher
case, discussed at text accompanying notes 47-59 infra, could be found guilty under
these 3 statutes. For discussions of the problems with existing state trade secret
statutes, see Comment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Tech-
nical Information, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 911, 927-34 (1967); 52 IowA L. REV. 63,
74-77 (1966).
46 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Oppen-
heim, The Judicial Process in Unfair Competition Law, in NURTURING NEW IDEAS:
LEGAL RrGHTS AND ECONOMIC Rorxs, supra note 7, at 192.
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obtaining sixteen photographs of the plant. DuPont contacted the two
and asked them to reveal the name of the person or corporation request-
ing the photographs. The Christophers declined. Later they delivered
the fruits of their labor to their client.
Subsequently, duPont filed a diversity suit in federal district court,
charging the Christophers with wrongfully obtaining photographs re-
vealing the company's trade secrets and selling them to an undisclosed
third party. The complaint recited the research involved in the process,
its competitive value, the special precautions taken to protect it, and
the value of the photographs in deducing the secret. DuPont sought
damages and an injunction. The Christophers moved for dismissal for
failure to state a claim, while duPont moved for an order compelling
disclosure of the identity of its competitor. DuPont won both contests.
On the Christophers' interlocutory appeal from the trial judge's refusal
to dismiss, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari and rehearing.4 7 The final outcome of the case can scarcely
be said to hang in the balance.
The Fifth Circuit's decision is especially illuminating in both the
treatment of the asserted defense and the court's piercing of the veil
of form to affirm the substance of the wrong, but it also points to the
difficulties inherent in judicial resolution of the doctrinal problems dis-
cussed earlier. The Christophers argued that they had committed no
actionable wrong 4 8 either in taking the photographs or in transmitting
them to their client: they had conducted all of their activities in public
airspace, breached no confidence, engaged in neither fraudulent nor
illegal conduct, indeed, violated no government aviation standard. In
sum, the Christophers argued that misappropriation of trade secrets
cannot be actionable absent trespass, breach of a confidential relation-
ship, or violation of an explicit legal prohibition.
The court of appeals rejected these contentions. Though the Texas
precedents had dealt only with breach of confidence, trespass, or other
traditionally illegal conduct, the Texas Supreme Court had adopted 4 9
section 757 of the Restatement of Torts, which provides as grounds for
recovery, in addition to (1) breach of confidence, actionable against
both the individual who breaches and a recipient having notice of the
breach, and (2) receipt with notice that disclosure was caused by
mistake, a third, more flexible, ground: discovery by "improper
means." " The court of appeals accordingly stated:
47 E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 967 (1971).
48 Such a contention is not so far-fetched as it sounds: it is the inevitable culmi-
nation of the judicial avoidance of property doctrine in dealing with trade secret
theft.
49 Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763 (1958).
50 IV RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) :
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to
do so, is liable to the other if
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We . . . find meaning in subsection (a) and think that the
Texas Supreme Court clearly indicated by its adoption that
there is a cause of action for the discovery of a trade secret by
any "improper means." 51
This standard was innovative when adopted by the Restatement in
1939, because it broke from the mold of property and special relation-
ship distinctions. The Reporter of the Preliminary Draft of this pro-
vision had attempted to catalogue those means that were then im-
proper under the case law, citing "fraudulent representations, theft
from the person or from premises and trespass to the person or to land
or chattels," 52 and "disclosure in breach of contract or confidential re-
lation." " In final form, however, section 757 used only the term
"improper means" to cover all but the last of these items-and, indeed,
included a general disclaimer indicating both a lack of confidence in the
feasibility of a list and a sense of the sophisticated techniques to be
dealt with:
But means may be improper under this rule even though
they do not cause any other harm than that to the interest in
the trade secret. Examples of such means are fraudulent
misrepresentations to induce disclosure, tapping of telephone
wires, eavesdropping or other espionage. A complete cat-
alogue of improper means is not possible. In general they are
means which fall below the generally accepted standards of
commercial morality and reasonable conduct.4
In adopting the Restatement, the Fifth Circuit made an explicit
ruling: aerial photography is an improper means of obtaining a trade
secret.55  Had the court stopped there, superficial examination might
suggest the case was simple and the foresight of the authors of the
Restatement admirable.
But a new realm of difficulty emerges, evidenced by the court's
apparent feeling that it had to further explain:
One may use his competitor's secret process if he discovers
the process by reverse engineering applied to the finished
product; one may use a competitor's process if he discovers
it by his own independent research; but one may not avoid
these labors by taking the process from the discoverer without
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in
him by the other ....
51 431 F.2d at 1015 (emphasis added).
52 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 2, comment a at 5 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1938)
(Harry Shulman, Reporter).
53 Id. § 3, comment a at 7.
54 IV RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment f at 10-11 (1939).
55 431 F.2d at 1015.
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his permission at a time when he is taking reasonable pre-
cautions to maintain its secrecy.-
The court was probably correct in attempting to set out those actions
it saw as permissible. Quite clearly, if the standard is now "improper
means," generally defined in the Restatenent's comments as "means
which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial
morality and reasonable conduct," " we have even less than the feel
provided by the words "reasonable man" so common in tort law. A
means is "improper" because a court decides just that." And qualified
only, if at all, by the inclusion of "other espionage" in the comments to
section 757, that is precisely where the Restatement leaves it-without
definition.
Thus one must grant that the Restatement has provided one
admirable service: it has opened the door previously hinged on the
property concept and bolted with the special-relationship rules. The
question now to be faced is whether at this time in history, in light of
the multiplication of trade secrets and expansion of sophisticated in-
dustry on a nationwide scale, recited at the beginning of this Comment,
we can afford the costs inherent in leaving the contours of trade secret
law to the leisurely development of the common law of the states.
Guidance is needed.
The judgments whether to utilize common or statutory law, and
whether that law should be promulgated at the state or federal level, are
ones that, absent questions of federalism, involve a weighing of costs.
It is submitted that the choice in the area of trade secret protection
should favor uniformity of legal standards and interpretations, and
clarity and specificity in the particular rules of conduct to be imposed.
The problem is too great and too immediate to wait for state courts
to evolve standards and to risk nonuniformity. 9  If legislation is not
invoked in the trade secret area, the courts will, at best, have to begin
from scratch. At worst, they may fail to avail themselves of the
opening provided by the Restatement. And if the legislation is not
56Id.
57 IV RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment f at 11 (1939).
58 "Generally accepted standards of commercial morality" provides little if any
guidance. In fact, the Fifth Circuit went on to suggest that the only standard
possible is one imposed by the courts independent of commercial morality:
In taking this position we realize that industrial espionage of the sort
here perpetrated has become a popular sport in some segments of our indus-
trial community. However, our devotion to free wheeling industrial compe-
tition must not force us into accepting the law of the jungle as the standard
of morality expected in our commercial relations.
431 F.2d at 1016 (emphasis added). And, even more directly, "The market place
must not deviate from our mores." Id. at 1017. The search for standards of com-
mercial morality within the business community is not likely to be much more fruitful
than the court perceived. For some varying views on the commercial morality of
industrial espionage, see Furash, Problems in Review-Industrial Espionage, 37
HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1959, at 6.
59 The value of stolen trade secrets has been estimated at $2 billion per year,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1965, §1, at 53, col. 6, and the losses through electronic
devices alone, $150 million, Vandevoort, supra note 5, at 692.
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federal, we will lose both the inherent uniformity of statutory rules and
the impetus toward uniformity of construction arising from the work-
ings of a unitary federal judicial system and the requirements imposed
on the state judiciary by the supremacy clause.
The questions whether the federal government can, and should,
provide such legislation remain. When we turn to those problems,
however, the case for federal legislation becomes even clearer, because
the federal failure to exercise such a power sooner has not merely al-
lowed confusion to pervade the area; it has actually been a cause of
some of that confusion.
III. THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION PROBLEM
The Christopher decision, it can be seen, is not a comprehensive
solution to the trade secret problem. Common law civil remedies are
likely to prove inadequate both in providing a uniformly effective
remedy for the improper procurement of trade secrets and in suc-
cessfully deterring those who would engage in that practice. The
inherent jurisdictional limitations of state law in this area present a
severe disadvantage. Additionally, the federal preemption problem has
not been convincingly laid to rest. If federal preemption extends beyond
Sears and Compco-as Lear at least threatens-even the type of pro-
tection offered by Christopher may be unconstitutional. This section
will discuss the magnitude of the preemption threat to state trade secret
protection, and the next will proceed to the question of the desirability
and need for federal legislation. In discussing federal preemption, it
will be necessary to analyze the social and economic desirability of trade
secret protection within the context of the policy underlying the patent
scheme and federal antitrust law.
The preliminary federal preemption question is whether the con-
stitutional grant of the patent power to Congress " is an absolute bar
to state action in the field. Some language in Justice Black's majority
opinion in Sears suggests that the reason the patent power was allocated
to the national government by the founding fathers was a need for
nationwide uniformity to ensure effective patent protection.6 This
basis for federal power, expounded in one of Madison's issues of The
Federalist," stands in contrast to a second reason for granting power
to the national government: the need for a uniform, nationwide policy
to preserve the integrity of the union, in matters in which varying state
law would rend it. Examples of the latter function are regulation of
foreign commerce,63 the issuance of currency,' and the war power, 5
which are all within the federal legislative power under article I, section
60 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
61376 U.S. at 228.
62THE FEDE.ALiST No. 43 (J. Madison), cited in 376 U.S. at 228.
63 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
64 Id. C1. 5.
65 d. cl. 11.
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8, and in which it has always been agreed that the federal power is
exclusive. Certain other article I, section 8 powers, most notably the
power to regulate interstate commerce, 6 are recognized as removing
from state authority an enclave of exclusive federal power, 7 whose size
may vary somewhat with the extent to which Congress has chosen to
exercise that power."8 The patent clause, in the absence of any special
reason for concluding that federal power is exclusive, should be viewed
in the same manner as the interstate commerce clause. Judicial lan-
guage that questions state laws regulating the dissemination of inven-
tions 69 typically assumes the existence of a residuum of state power in
the face of the patent clause,7° but questions the validity of the specific
manner of exercise of that power, under the supremacy clause.7 '
The question, then, should be the extent to which state legislatures
can protect unpatented or unpatentable ideas without running afoul of
the national patent scheme and therefore the supremacy clause. It is
settled that state law is limited not only by the bounds of the acts of
Congress but also by general federal policy as formulated by those
statutes.7 ' The Supreme Court's language in Sears, Compco, and
Lear, as will be shown, did not resolve the issue of the breadth of federal
policy.
To the extent that it casts into doubt the consistency with public
policy of protecting licenses of unpatentable ideas, Lear necessarily
threatens the entire concept of legally protectible value in an industrial
secret--even an undisclosed one. In terms of federal patent policy,
there is no distinction between protecting contractual disclosure to a
second party for the purpose of increasing production of goods manu-
factured through use of the secret, and protecting against breach of
confidence or espionage. To deny all protection, however, would be to
say that there is no value the law will protect in what is concededly a
valuable trade secret.
The generalizations in Sears, Compco, and Lear, seen by the patent
bar as disastrous were, however, no more than justifiable comments on
the cases then before the Court and should not be taken, as Justice Black
himself took them, 3 as statements declaring the preemption of trade
secret laws. Trade secret laws are much different from the unfair
competition laws invalidated in Sears and Compco, and raise issues
different from those treated in Lear.
6GId. cl. 3.
67See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
68 See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
6 9 E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
70 E.g., id.: "When state law touches upon the area of these federal [patent and
copyright] statutes, it is 'familiar doctrine' that the federal policy 'may not be set at
naught, or its benefits denied' by the state law."
71 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
72 See Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 63-64 (1954).
73 See text accompanying notes 79-81 infra.
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In Lear, an inventor of an improved gyroscope had licensed a
manufacturer to use his invention. Royalties were to cease when and
if the United States Patent Office refused to patent the invention. Lear
ceased payments in the belief the patent would not be granted, but was
wrong. When the inventor sued for royalties for the periods both
before and after the grant of the patent, Lear defended by attacking the
patent on the ground it had been procured by fraud. The state court
held that, regardless of the patent's validity, the royalties were recover-
able under state law. The case did not, however, call for a decision on
whether a state could, consistent with federal patent policy, extend pro-
tection to unpatented trade secrets. The Court expressly left unanswered
the question whether licenses of unpatented ideas are enforceable. 4 Lear
merely decided that a state cannot enforce a patent royalty agreement
if the licensee can prove the patent invalid.75 The Court based this
holding on a theory of frustration of overriding federal patent policy,
and concluded that requiring licensees to continue paying royalties
while the licensee is litigating patent validity would discourage patent
challenges by licensees, those with the strongest motive to challenge a
patent.7 1 Upholding an obligation to pay was also viewed as encourag-
ing dilatory litigation tactics by the patentee, which would both further
diminish the licensee's incentive to litigate and postpone the day when
the "invention" would, given a successful challenge, fully and freely
enter the public domain.7 7  The Court also observed that the dis-
incentive to litigate would bear most heavily in fields in which scientific
progress and concomitant technological obsolescence is most rapid: pro-
tracted litigation could absorb more time than the life of the invention,
rendering litigation valueless.78
Justice Black, however, took a much broader view of federal patent
policy. Citing his earlier opinions in Sears and Compco, he partially
dissented in Lear,79 concluding that a state may not enforce a contract
that licensed a secret during the period a patent application covering
that secret was pending if the discovery was later held unpatentable8 0
Justice Black's conclusion embodied a finding that the supremacy clause
in combination with federal patent law would void any protection by a
state of a contract for the use of a new discovery not protected by a
patent, whether or not a patent application is filed, and his conclusion
might be read so broadly as to preclude any state protection-even that
of the type afforded in the Christopher case. His reading of the specific
7- 395 U.S. at 674-75.
751d. at 674. The chief holding of the case was that "licensee estoppel" was
contrary to patent policy: patent licensees were to be free to challenge the validity






392 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
holdings in Sears and Compco, however, as well as his policy analysis, is
from from compelling.81
The conflict with federal patent policy in Sears and Compco was
clear in a way not manifest if limited protection of trade secrets is
afforded through enforcement of royalty agreements when no patent has
been granted (whether applied for or not) or through recognition of a
cause of action for improper procurement of such secrets. The unfair
competition law invalidated by the Supreme Court in these two cases was
interpreted to prohibit the copying of unpatented manufactured objects.8 2
In other words, the state granted a virtual monopoly-broad protection
closely paralleling that of federal patent law--over the production of
certain products not meeting federal standards of patentability. With
this sort of protection, free and open competition was subverted and
federal policy contravened.
This obvious conflict is absent in the Lear factual situation prior
to the patent application, as it is absent in the Christopher factual
situation: protection is limited and does not resemble monopoly. In
Lear no one other than the licensee would be restrained since others,
who could learn the secret by reverse engineering, could employ it in
any way they desired. In Christopher the restraint was upon procure-
ment by "improper" means. Neither involves any time limits or
absolute prohibitions.
So long as secrecy is maintained, the owner does enjoy a
monopoly-but it is scarcely absolute. It can be extinguished by
legitimate independent discovery or reverse engineering by others.
Even if protection continues after limited disclosure by means of
enforceable contractual licensing agreements such as the ones invalidated
in Lear, the results need not be heinously monopolistic.8 3  Section 2
of the Sherman Act '4 would rarely prohibit the limited competitive
advantage obtained by a small firm that seeks merely to recoup its de-
velopment costs by licensing an invention to others better able to market
it.', Such advantages, far from lessening competition as do the patent
and trade secret pools of corporate giants, 8 actually increase com-
petition by allowing small firms to survive in a market dominated by
81 Justice Black complained that Sears and Compco "directly" decided that a
state cannot enforce licenses of ideas on which patent applications were pending and
that were later held unpatentable. Id.
82 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226 (1964). The
Court seemed to feel that Illinois law also required a showing that the copied article
was "palmed off" as the product of the original manufacturer, an evil the states can
legitimately prohibit, but declined to reconsider the Seventh Circuit's broader inter-
pretation of the law.
83 See generally Clinic on Unfair Trade Practices, Unfair Trade Practices Relat-
ing to Industrial-Intellectual Property, 14 IDEA384 (1970).
8415 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
85 Cf. Arnold & Goldstein, supra note 20, at 1248-50.
86 See Professor Schwartz's dissent to REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENEmRx's NAT'L
COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTrr UST LAws, in 1 ANTITRUST BuLL. 37, 61 (1955).
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large ones. Deprivation of protection may mean destruction of the
profitability of basic research in addition to the elimination of small
firms that might engage in it with a view to licensing. The repression
of research incentives should be viewed with even more alarm in an
age when much research is already lost to obsolescence and to patent
restraint. Moreover, the effective prevention of disclosure, by refusing
to enforce contractual obligations entered into in return for disclosure,
is the greatest restraint possible. In looking at the monopoly issue and
antitrust implications one should keep in mind that all contracts, in-
cluding trade secret licenses, strictly speaking, are restraints of trade,
but that not all restraints of trade violate the Sherman Act. The Act
remains available to invalidate those trade secret licenses with monop-
olistic tendencies.
87
Under the traditional view, the patent system strikes a balance
between the ideal of unrestricted public access to all worthwhile inven-
tions and the need for a strong incentive to inventive activity, by offer-
ing a government-protected monopoly to sufficiently worthwhile in-
novations. Trade secret protection has been increasingly sought by
modern industry because of accelerated technological progress, heavy
investment in research and development, and the need to maintain a
competitive advantage before obsolescence or legitimate discovery by
others. The present inadequacies of the patent system-frequently
unreachable standards of patentability, severe delays before the final
grant, and insufficient protection against subsequent infringers who
challenge the patent-have contributed to the search. 8 This section has
endeavored so far to show that prior Supreme Court decisions should
not be read to indicate that state trade secret protection is preempted by
the federal patent scheme. The remainder of this section will assess
the compatibility of trade secret law and the patent scheme in terms of
the two interests the patent system seeks to balance. 9
The principal reason for protecting industrial secrets against theft
is the incentive to innovation: a firm will expend considerable sums in
search of better products and processes only in anticipation of market
profits. It needs the competitive edge derived from its innovation to
recoup its investment in research. It is the head start, or additional
lead time, secured by secrecy that gives the developer that competitive
87 Invalidation of contracts not void under the antitrust laws raises the issue of
an unconstitutional impairment of contract. Also, since invalidation of a trade secret
or know-how license places the subject matter in the public domain, that action is
arguably a fifth amendment violation in that it amounts to taldng private property
for public use without just compensation. See Clinic on Unfair Trade Practices,
supra note 83.
88 See text accompanying notes 6-11 supra.
89 See, e.g., Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal
Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1432, 1451-52 (1967) (economic
justification for trade secret protection) ; Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHiao ST. LJ.
4, 31 (1962) (social policy condemnation of trade secret protection). See also
Comment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Informa-
tion, 14 U.C.L.A.L. RFv. 911, 912-15 (1967) (compilation of economic and social
policy arguments).
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edge and affords opportunity for the recoupment of research investment
costs that copying competitors do not have to incur.90 This encourage-
ment of research and scientific progress is basic to the patent system; 91
the patent system affords all this protection and more. But much that
is worthwhile is unpatentable, and the law should not by denying all
protection to unpatentable ideas contribute to the obliteration of in-
centives. The social advantage to the public of trade secret protection
is an increased number of useful discoveries, especially by smaller firms
unable to apply their own discoveries by production and too small to
absorb the crushing loss of industrial theft. Competition will increase
and economic efficiency will be encouraged by the development of com-
petitive substitutes for any given commodity or process. Also, the price
of a new product in high-development industries should be lower when
it reaches the market, because its cost will not be inflated by the added
expense of both unproductive defensive measures against espionage and
a reserve for losses to industrial spies.
One argument against protecting industrial secrets is the desir-
ability of public disclosure of all scientific advances, another assumption
underlying the patent system. The disclosure required by the patent
laws places a new invention in the public domain where it functions as
a base from which further advances can spring. Persons other than
the inventor can utilize the scientific knowledge incorporated in the
invention in their own research and development. Wasteful duplication
of research can be avoided, lowering the market price of comparable
items. Thus courts will be reluctant to find patent infringement when
through nonuse of a patent a firm has sought to suppress technical
information regarding a new advance to maintain demand for the
products it now manufactures. 2  But where unpatentable ideas are
concerned the choice may well be between some wasteful research under
a system of limited trade secret protection and insufficient research re-
sulting from unprofitability where no protection is provided.
Do the short-term public benefits secured by immediate disclosure
through undeterred espionage or refusal to enforce contractual agree-
ments outweigh the long-term gains afforded by legal protections
that encourage research? Given the costly research efforts now
common in a large number of industries and the increased vulnerability
of such efforts to modern methods of industrial espionage, a denial of
legal sanctions and remedies opens the door to large-scale theft. If
trade secret royalty agreements are not enforced, the inventor or
originator of the idea will surely not disclose it to anyone, and theft
or espionage will be the only method of obtaining the secrets. Any
0 See Comment, The Viability of Trade Secret Protection After Lear v. Adkins,
16 VL. L. REv. 551, 564 (1971).
91 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
92 Glendenning v. Mack, 159 F. Supp. 665, 668 (D. Minn. 1958). But see
Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nestor Glass Co., 71 F.2d 539, 566 (8th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 625 (1935).
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policy favoring across-the-board disclosure will be defeated except to
the extent that theft and espionage propagate the secret information.
Free competition in this sense becomes unbridled and may well lead to
an escalating ground war of electronic espionage maneuvers punctuated
by photo-reconnaissance sorties from the air. Except when the secret
is a process as in Christopher, even with protection of the secret, the
product of the secret will enter the public domain, where it will be sub-
ject to discovery by others through reverse engineering. Thus, trade
secret protection cannot perpetuate secrecy except in limited circum-
stances, and, like the patent system, will ensure disclosure, but in a
different way. In the Christopher-type situation, the ramifications of
nonprotection-rapidly escalating industrial espionage raising product
costs and disrupting business-are sufficiently undesirable to outweigh
any benefits in disclosure. Since dissemination through espionage and
theft is not a part of the patent scheme, protection against it cannot be
preempted by the federal law.
Evaluating Justice Black's concerns, then, state trade secret pro-
tection and federal patent and antitrust policies seem fair bedfellows.
Similar objectives are furthered, without any significant incom-
patibilities.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Painton & Co. v.
Bourns, Inc., 3 has advanced some of the arguments proffered by this
Comment, taking a broad view of the permissibility of state protection
of trade secrets. The dispute revolved around Painton's right to con-
tinue using information supplied by Bourns after the expiration of the
agreement between them. Painton sought a declaratory judgment of
its continued right to use the information. The district court upheld
that right as to unpatented items on the theory that state protection of
Bourns' unpatented discoveries would discourage patent applications
and thereby undermine a federal policy." Reversing the lower court,
the court of appeals distinguished Sears and Compco:
The Illinois law of unfair competition invalidated in Sears
and Compco did confer a monopoly against copying an article
otherwise in the public domain, a monopoly good against
non-contractors just as a patent or copyright would have
been. . . . An agreement licensing a trade secret is an alto-
gether different matter. It binds no one except the licensee;
all others are free, as the licensee previously was, to attempt
by fair means to figure out what the secret is and, if they
succeed, to practice it. 5
Writing for the court, Judge Friendly reasoned that leaving trade
secrets completely unprotected would foster hoarding by the originator
and therefore either an economic monopoly or complete disuse. Judge
93442 F.2d 216 (1971).
94309 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), noted in 84 H. v. L. REV. 477 (1970).
95 442 F2d at 223.
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Friendly also countered the argument that the policy underlying federal
patent law would be undermined by state protection of trade secrets.
Dividing trade secrets into three categories-(1) those believed by the
owner to be patentable, (2) those known to be unpatentable, and
(3) those whose patentability is dubious-he found little substance to
the discouragement argument. Patent protection is still significantly
broader than any sanctionable state protection of trade secrets. An
inventor confident of his discovery's patentability would hardly trade
the complete monopoly of a patent for protection only against a licensee's
refusal to pay royalties or against any other person's procuring the
secret by improper means. This added protection would also serve as
an incentive for the inventor unsure of patentability to apply for a
patent. Even if applications in this category would be stimulated by
denying protection, the value of this tendency is dubious because dis-
closure to those willing to pay for the secret-patented or not- will be
unnecessarily postponed. And when the inventor is certain of his idea's
unpatentability, he would not apply under any circumstances: the dis-
couragement argument fails again. Finally, Judge Friendly pointed
out that neither Lear nor federal patent policy requires that all ideas be
placed in the public domain and be dedicated to the public good: the
only requirement is that all ideas already in general circulation, but not
protected by a valid patent, be devoted to the public good. Limited
trade secret protection would not contravene this requirement.
Painton is a commendable development in the law and would
shield state protection of trade secrets from federal preemption. Neither
the Supreme Court nor other circuits, however, have now accepted its
rationale. But even if Painton is accepted, problems remain. Not only
is the protection offered under the Christopher decision, even if soundly
constitutional, questionable in other jurisdictions, but the trade secret
protection doctrines in other states are confusing and ambiguous. Uni-
form protection against the most advanced methods of trade secret
depredation is patently lacking. Without this basic protection, the
Painton advancement in the application of federal preemption concepts
to trade secret law is meaningless and could become moribund. Those
attempts that have been made at state legislation have been shortsighted
and insufficient. 6 Although states should extend the type of protection
offered in Christopher, and a Painton-type analysis would shield any
such state measures until federal legislation decisively settles the pre-
emption issue, federal legislation should be an immediate goal.
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
If economic imperatives will ensure disclosure of trade secrets
when desirable, one tenet of traditional theory remains to be disposed
of: that all inventions worthy of public protection can receive it through
the patent system. This tenet, just as the others, is far from ironclad.
96 See note 5 supra & accompanying text; note 45 supra & accompanying text.
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The extremely high requirements for patentability have recently come
under attack,9" as has their administration by the courts." Such criti-
cisms attack not the patent system itself, but rather the absence of
uniform and realistic standards of patentability protecting a sufficient
range of worthwhile innovations. 9
One authority has categorized the range of subject matter that
an industrialist would wish to protect by trade secret law as follows:
(1) patentable inventions,
(2) inventions short of the statutory standard of novelty and
invention,
(3) technology associated with product (e.g. plans, speci-
fications),
(4) non-technological, internal business organization, and
operating methods, and
(5) general methods of doing business, advertising cam-
paigns, market research studies, lists of customers, and
supplies. 0 0
Courts and legislatures have failed to recognize the importance of
distinguishing these five categories and deciding what protection each
merits. The first category, patentable inventions, is already accounted
for, and the Patent Office treats these as trade secrets while an applica-
tion is pending.' The second category, unpatentable inventions, in-
cludes the major portion of industrial trade secrets and should be
treated as property and protected by federal law, both civil and crim-
inal.'0 2 The third category, product technology, encompasses the broad
range of industrial know-how that has assumed increasing impor-
tance, especially in the area of international trade.'3 Technology and
know-how licenses bring into the United States over $1 billion in
foreign exchange each year.'04 Perhaps federal laws could facilitate the
97 See, e.g., Arnold & Goldstein, supra note 20, at 1256-59.
98 Rich, .upra note 7.
99 See Arnold & Goldstein, supra note 20, at 1256:
The number of innovations that are truly breakthroughs of such stature
as to negate all arguments of obviousness that some court is likely to buy is
de minimis. For example, the inventions often thought of as the most im-
portant of the last century are the electric light, the telephone, the electro-
magnetic motor, the air brake, and barbed wire. All five were such minor
modifications of prior art and were so suggested by the prior art that a
majority of today's courts would clearly find they lacked the requisite
unobviousness to be patentable.
100 Milbank, Finders Keepers, Licensors Weepers, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 343,
344 (1970), citing Doerfer, supra note 89.
10135 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
102 See text accompanying notes 106-11 infra.
103 See generally Behrman, Licensing Abroad Under Patents, Trademarks and
Know-How by U.S. Companies, in NURTURING NEw IDEAS: LEGAL RiGHTS AwD
EcONOMic ROLES, supra note 7, at 412.
10 4 See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 226 n.7 (2d Cir. 1971);
Arnold & Goldstein, supra note 20, at 1252.
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international agreements on which these licenses depend. Germany,
Austria, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, France, Belgium, and the
Netherlands protect industrial know-how under various provisions of
unfair competition law.' 5 In an era of expanding international trade,
protection of know-how agreements is necessary and desirable. Ideas
covered by the fourth and fifth categories, non-technical operating
methods and general methods of doing business, have competitive value,
but they are neither scientific nor technological. They cannot serve as
springboards for further useful research. Because of the vastly wider
scope of their circulation throughout the firm, they are already quasi-
public knowledge and thus not a target for large-scale theft. Accord-
ingly protection is not imperative. It appears, then, that the only
categories whose protection must be provided for are unpatented in-
dustrial inventions and industrial know-how.
Federal legislation should provide both civil and criminal remedies.
A civil injunction will have meaning against a trade secret thief only
if he is engaged as well in an otherwise legitimate business at a fixed
location (like the Christophers). The mobile industrial spy, assuming
one can effect service of process, will receive the injunction with as
much amusement as a safecracker who is told he must henceforth desist
from plying his trade. Even if damages are awarded, the ultimate
buyer of the secret might not be found, and the mobile industrial spy is
likely to be judgment-proof. And if either the thief or the firm that
hired him is foreign, personal jurisdiction will be difficult to obtain.10
Several years ago when the elusive Dr. Aries fled to Europe with
his stolen drug formulas, American authorities were at first frustrated
in their attempts to bring him back for trial. France and Switzerland,
nations punishing theft of trade secrets, refused extradition because the
theft in itself was not a federal crime in the United States. At a time
of expanding international trade, industrial agreements, and com-
munications, federal criminal legislation will facilitate both extradition
of international thieves and prosecution by foreign tribunals that claim
jurisdiction only if the offense is criminal under American federal law.'
0 7
Criminal prosecution would likely be levied only in cases of con-
siderable importance in which the evidence of guilt is clear. The lower
standard of proof required in a civil action, as well as the ability to
initiate the action independent of prosecutorial discretion, would induce
civil prosecution in most instances. Civil remedies should prove effec-
tive against "established" thieves, and criminal remedies would aid in
halting the activities of the more mobile variety. But uniform civil
protection after disclosure, while necessary, is insufficient. Given the
05 See Ladas, Legal Protection of Know-How, in NURTURING NEW IDEAs:
LEGAL RIGHTS AND EcONOmIC RoLEs, supra note 7, at 456, 462; Newcomer, Legal
Protection and Licensing of 'Know-How" Internationally, 7 Am. Bus. L.J. 227,
230-32 (1970).
'
0 6 See 52 IowA L. Ray. 63, 73 (1966).
107 See E. ENGBERG, THE SPY IN THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE 109 (1967).
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technical means of espionage now available, only a matching criminal
statute can provide sufficient deterrence and enforcement against the
mobile spy whom the civil law could not otherwise reach.
One commentator has advanced arguments in favor of such a
statute sufficiently compelling to bear extended quotation:
1. Small business is most vulnerable. Patents are often
overlooked and insufficient to protect a small entrepreneur
from an unscrupulous employee. The small businessman
usually lacks the funds to pursue his civil remedies against a
theft.
2. Civil discovery procedure is inadequate to investigate
and seize the evidence necessary to establish guilt. A criminal
statute throws up safeguards and this may seem anomalous
at first, but the significance that a crime has been committed
or alleged will deter many a lawyer from dilatory tactics.
. . . Given the intent to take anything or harm anyone,
without excuse or justification, plus an overt act directed at
carrying out that intent, a crime is complete-even though no
property is actually taken or damaged. Thus, the property
aspect of a criminal trade secret law is only a secondary con-
sideration-just as it would be with any other criminal law.
3. Objective standards are automatically created. A
body of solid case law would serve and buttress the civil arena.
4. As a natural corollary, criminal law protection would
protect the free alienation of trade secrets since the State
recognizes value, and anything of value can be bought and
sold.
5. This approach avoids the ultimate destructive force
which bears on any civil case law, i.e., funded interests which
are willing to finance new companies, the consideration [for]
subrosa morality [being] stock options.'
The first and fifth of these arguments immediately emphasize the most
salutary aspects of a criminal law in this area: small firms on the verge
of entering a market have the benefit of protection enforced by the
state, while large competitors willing to risk a damage judgment in
suborning theft are deterred by the graver threat of imprisonment.
The third and fourth arguments demonstrate the essentially com-
plementary relationship possible between the civil and criminal laws,
while the second is a workable attempt at defining the material elements
of the offense. If, in addition, the standards for protectible trade
secrets were the same as in the civil law, the proposed criminal law
could work effectively in terms of both property and conduct-by pro-
108 Vandevoort, supra note 5, at 690-91.
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scribing both the piracy of a definite category of secrets and the act of
espionage itself." 9
Several problems of proof inherent in the piracy of trade secrets
remain to be solved. Though an airplane circling a new factory presents
sufficient grounds for suspicion, certain methods of electronic espionage
are nearly undetectable." In such cases the owner will have no culprit
against whom he can set the criminal statute and his only remedy might
be under civil law once the beneficiary of the theft turns his spoils
to profit on the open market. A defense of independent invention or
discovery by reverse engineering might be hard to challenge in such
a situation.
Pirates sued under the civil law have been known to demur on
the ground that the alleged trade secret is no secret at all, but is really
in the public domain.'-' Disproof of this position can be touchy when
it necessitates the plaintiff's revealing his secret knowledge in detail to
shows its advantage over publicly known advances in the art. An ad-
versarial in camera hearing would only keep the secret from the world,
while the immediate concern is revelation to the other party. An
ex parte hearing, however, precludes cross-examination, which is par-
ticularly valuable in a technical field in which the judge may lack ex-
pertise, and indispensable under criminal procedural standards." 2
Federal legislation in the trade secret area should reerect a licensee
estoppel principle. Elimination of licensee estoppel for patent licensees
may well serve the public interest. Licensees, who are in the best
position and have the greatest incentive to challenge the validity of a
patent, are now allowed to subject dubious patents to the scrutiny of
the courts and thus rid the economy of spurious patents and the
monopolistic power they confer.113 The holder of a valid patent, on the
other hand, can still protect himself by suing for accrued royalties and
terminating the license." 4 Allowing trade secret licensees to challenge
the protectibility of the licensed information, however, is far different
from the patent situation. A patent grant confers total monopoly for
seventeen years." 5 Only truly unique and worthwhile inventions
should get such strong government protection. But protecting trade
secrets against misappropriation is much weaker than granting patents;
a trade secret is drastically limited by vulnerability to independent dis-
covery and reverse engineering. Trade secret agreements and know-
how licenses are made between parties knowing enough about the
technological field to gauge the risk of legitimate discovery. And the
109 Such provisions would also eliminate the tangibility problem encountered in
the federal Stolen Property Act and many comparable state statutes. Compare, e.g.,
statutes cited notes 5, 45 supra.
110 See Netolicky, supra note 1, at 218.
11 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
112 See generally Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119
U. PA. L. Rav. 711 (1971).
113 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
114 Handler, supra note 19, at 187.
115 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
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bargain struck in an arm's-length negotiation will reflect this risk. If
licensee estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent a licensee from re-
pudiating his bargain, the licensor can find little solace in merely suing
for accrued royalties. An agreement to pay royalties for a real trade
secret may be unenforceable,"' and lack of estoppel might encourage
closing sessions at which the licensee signs the agreement with one
hand and before the ink is dry pulls a complaint for invalidity from
behind his back with the other. If the secret is held invalid, the licensee
will have obtained voluntary disclosure of a secret considered valuable
by the owner and by the licensee, but not by the court. The licensee's
own purchase of the license should estop his arguing that the informa-
tion is already in the public domain and worthless. Otherwise the
owner of a real trade secret can gain nothing by revoking the license,
for repudiation by the licensee has made the contract into nothing more
than the voluntary disclosure, without consideration, of a valuable trade
secret that has now become utterly worthless to its rightful owner.
Federal legislation will not be easy to draw. This Comment has
suggested that nontechnical operating methods should not be protected
from the probing of others." 7 The problems incurred in the adminis-
tration of the minimum standards of novelty and unobviousness will
probably be encountered again in trade secret legislation. Nevertheless,
the federal legislation should be as specific as possible in distinguishing
between nontechnical operating methods and general ways of doing
business, neither of which deserves protection, and the remaining
spectrum of possible industrial secrets, which the legislation should
protect.
CONCLUSION
The technological developments that spurred industrial recovery
after the second world war have given rise to enormous investments for
research and development in a continuing search for better products to
satisfy expanding world markets. These investments in technological
progress, coupled with ever more rapid obsolescence, have led to an
increased reliance on trade secrets and know-how licensing on a national
and international scale, and a corresponding rise in industrial espionage.
The present patchwork of confused common law doctrines and state
criminal statutes is inadequate to protect the first and prevent the second.
Sears and Lear demonstrate that the unresolved conflicts in trade
secret doctrine, as well as the external problems of accommodation with
the patent scheme and national goals of free competition, cannot be
easily settled by the courts. DuPont v. Christopher is a step in the
right direction, but only federal statutes can ensure the uniformity and
deterrence needed in the law of trade secrets. This problem area seems
a fitting subject for Congressional hearings and legislation.
116 This was the question left open by the Supreme Court in Lear. See 395 U.S.
at 674-75.
117 Text following note 105 supra.
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